Игры онлайн на деньги с бонусом
I can do игры онлайн на деньги с бонусом than this by playing L at node 8; so that is what I does, and the game terminates without II getting to move. A puzzle is then raised by Bicchieri (along with other authors, including Binmore (1987) and Pettit and Sugden (1989)) by way of the following reasoning.
Player I plays L at node 8 игры онлайн на деньги с бонусом she knows that Player II is economically rational, and so would, at node 9, play L because Player II knows that Player I is economically rational and so would, at node 10, play L.
Both players use backward induction to solve the game; backward induction requires that Player I know that Player II knows that Player I is economically rational; but Player II can solve the game only by using a backward induction argument that takes as a premise the failure of Player I интернет игра на деньги behave in accordance with economic rationality.
This is the paradox как рекламировать игру за деньги backward induction. That is, a player might intend to take an action but then slip up in the execution and send the game down some other path instead.
In our example, Player II could reason about what to do at node 9 conditional on the assumption that Player I chose L at node 8 but then slipped.
Gintis (2009a) points out that the apparent paradox does not arise merely from our supposing that both players are economically rational. It rests crucially on the игры на деньги из мобильного premise that each player must know, and reasons on the basis of knowing, that the other player is economically rational.
We will return to this issue in Section 7 below. The paradox of backward induction, like the puzzles игры онлайн на деньги с бонусом by equilibrium refinement, is mainly a problem for those who view game theory as contributing to a normative theory of rationality (specifically, as contributing to that larger theory the theory of strategic rationality).
This involves appeal to the empirical fact that actual agents, including people, must learn the equilibrium strategies of games they play, at least whenever the games are at all complicated.
As a result, when set into what is intended to be онлайн казино вулкан официальный сайт one-shot PD in the experimental laboratory, people tend to initially play as if the game were a single round of a repeated PD.
The repeated PD has many Nash equilibria that involve cooperation rather than defection. Thus experimental subjects tend to cooperate at first in these circumstances, but learn after some number of rounds to defect.
The experimenter cannot infer that she has successfully induced a игры онлайн на деньги с бонусом PD with игры онлайн на деньги с бонусом experimental setup until she sees this behavior stabilize.
If players of games realize that other players may need to learn game structures and equilibria from experience, this gives them reason to take account of what happens off the equilibrium paths of extensive-form games.
Of course, if a player fears that other players have not learned equilibrium, this may well remove her incentive to play an equilibrium strategy herself.]